Originally published on my Facebook (John Blakely) page in March 2011, I thought this might be useful reading for anyone contemplating an intervention in Syria and the serious business of making war, however justified it may be.
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After an unplanned early evening nap I woke up to the announcement that the United Nations Security Council had approved the creation of a 'no-fly zone' over Libya; further to that, Canada will be contributing militarily to its enforcement. That unplanned nap led to this unplanned posting. I had intended my next couple of Notes to be a comment on the state of women in North America shortly after International Women’s Day, and one on the current uproar over hockey violence. However events change so here we go...
Whether you agree with either decision (the no-fly zone and Canada's participation in it) or not it is a significant step, not only because it required the rare approval (or abstainment) of all five permanent SC members, but it also authorized attacks against Moammar Gadhafi's forces on the ground. This action dramatically changes the fate of Gadhafi's regime, in short if the international community follows through - and there is every indication it will - unless a third party country takes him into exile, Gadhfi is finished. It may be months or a year, however he likely will meet the same fate as Saddam Hussein, a violent man facing execution at the hands of his own people.
Canada's participation should surprise no one, it is one of the few NATO countries with experience in enforcing no fly zones which it did over Bosnia in the late 1990's under then Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Canada's air force was also a participant in the 1999 air war over Kosovo and Yugoslavia, where although having one of the smaller contingents it flew the third most bombing strikes against Yugoslav ground forces and cities after the United States and Britain.
I would remind Canadians (who may be feeling self righteous about not participating in the Iraq War) that in that conflict they did not have a UN Security Council resolution either, nor was there an attempt to seek one. However regardless, we did participate as combatants in the bombing of a sovereign European country, and the following occupation (under the guise of KFOR - a NATO led enforcement mission often mistakenly referred to as a peacekeeping mission) of a part of it's territory. Why mention this? Not to say that I was opposed to it, but just in orderto give some context regarding Canada's history of participating in these types of combat missions - because that's what they are - in circumstance both with and without UN approval. Canadians have notoriously short and selective historical memories so it is important to point out that this is not something new - although I am sure the media (who also have short memories) will report it as such.
No fly zones - although they exist in the civilian context over for example Walt Disney World and Buckingham Palace - first came into the common vernacular after the first Gulf War (which did have UN approval and in which Canada contributed). It was put in place immediately as a condition of the ceasefire, and initially applied only to 'fixed wing' aircraft (ie. fighter jets or bombers). However when a failed uprising by Shiites in southern Iraq, encouraged by then president George HW Bush and a similar one in the north by Iraqi Kurds was put down by Saddam Hussein’s forces primarily with the use of helicopters the mandate of the zone was used to cover those too.
The use of helicopters is a tricky one, in the case of the Gulf War, the Iraqi general present at the ceasefire stated to U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf that he needed to fly his helicopters in order to properly withdraw his forces which had their mobility restricted due to allied bombing of Iraqi bridges and roads. Under these circumstances the request seemed reasonable and Schwarzkopf agreed, not being aware of the impending rebellion in the south.
No such restriction will be allowed in the Libyan situation. Most of Gadhafi's helicopters are of the same variety as Saddam's old Soviet Era Hind models which can be used for both troop transport and ground attack. Libya is a large country with poor infrastructure outside main cities, an argument could be made that helicoptes are needed to evacuate wounded or deliver humanitarian aide. No dice, not this time; likely any Libyan helicopter that is caught by a NATO or Arab League jet will not be flying for long. As later happened in the Iraqi no-fly zone, Libyan air defences such as radars and missile batteries will be targeted too.
Opponents of no-fly zones rightly point to the 1992 - 1995 Bosnian War as an example of where they had little or no effect. No fly zones did not prevent Serb massacres of civilians in Screbanica or Zepa, nor did they prevent the Serbs from ramping up their attacks against Bosnian Muslim, and Bosnian Croat forces.
This point is a fair one to make and historically true, however the failure in fact had more to do with the timid application of the zone itself as well as the nature of the Bosnian terrain. Once the west - largely at American insistence - got serious in late summer 1995 the Serbs were brought to the bargaining table after an approximately two week NATO bombing campaign working in conjunction with a combined Bosnian/Croatian offensive on the ground. The resulting Dayton Accord, and a 60,000 strong NATO peacemaking force ended the fighting.
Any no fly zone in Libya will be more similar to the later example of the Bosnian rather than the Iraqi one because although not stated in the resolution NATO will effectively become the air force of the Libyan rebels. It will be more aggressively implemented, and as any soldier has has heard (and I heard it many times in my own rather unspectacular military career) the immediate outcome of any military action depends on two factors: 1 - 'The tactical situation', and 2 - 'The ground'. meaning the terrain on which that action will take place.
In dealing with the second point first; unlike Bosnia which is mountainous and heavily forested providing excellent cover for Serbian forces on the ground who were often successful at moving troops and equipment while avoiding NATO detection, Libya is largely open desert. There will be no hiding place for Libyan forces to manoeuvre against the rebels. Any Libyan armoured column moving against civilians will likely be detected by satellite and destroyed from the air. As was the case in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans, Libyan forces will likely resort to hiding heavy equipment in schools or moving their forces in ambulances or civilian vehicles to avoid NATO air attack.
Regarding the first point The Tactical Situation, the Libyan air force is old, it's pilots do not have anywhere near the training American, Canadian or British Royal Air Force pilots do, nor do they have the experience. Their morale is already low as witnessed by defections of pilots either flying their planes to safety in Malta, defecting to the rebels or as some rebels have suggested, deliberately dropping their bombs off target.
Although my former army colleagues may take umbrage at me pointing this out, air forces are the only armed service where most of those who participate in actual combat (with the exception for example of helicopter door gunners) are officers. The Libyan pilots who's aircraft will be the targets of any NATO strike represent the most highly educated component of the Libyan military. They know that UN Security Council Resolution 1973 means that their flying days will soon be over and - as happened in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, They will likely just stop flying or limit their flying to short range strikes by two or three aircraft.
In fact, in all previous instances of no fly zones actual examples of shooting down an offending aircraft as contrasted with ground attacks, are relatively rare. It happened in only one instance during the Bosnian War, and in the years between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq war only on a handful of occasions did Iraqi aircraft attempt to come into contact with patrolling US and Royal Air Force jets.
Even the Federal Republic of Yugoslav’s air force which was a relatively modern and by Eastern European standards fairly well trained and equipped one only made the most feeble of attempts to stop the NATO attacks on their country. In the entire 78 day air campaign only a few unsuccessful attempts were made against US, Dutch and Canadian aircraft, all resulting in the loss of Yugoslav jets and the deaths of pilots. Others took notice and just hid their aircraft and stopped flying. *(Although two US aircraft were lost in the Kosovo campaign, and the US, France and Britain each lost one aircraft over Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 - in all cases the pilots were rescued safely)
I predict something similar will happen in Libya. There will be a few token and ineffective attempts to stop NATO and Arab aircraft but these will end quickly and the process of attacking any advancing Libyan tanks, artillery or other vehicles and military infrastructure will continue.
As a final note to this piece; any reader that got this far into my posting will observe that I did not take a stance for or against the UN Resolution or Canada's participation. I merely gave historical context, and some background. This is especially important to Canadian readers who are by and large incredibly ignorant of things military, especially in regards to their own.
(Note: If you stopped the average Canadian on the streets of downtown Toronto, and showed them a photo with a line up of soldiers from a dozen different NATO countries and asked them to pick out which one is Canadian he/she likely wouldn't be able do it, neither can most Canadians name half a dozen pieces of equipment used by their own armed forces nor name three significant military actions taken by Canada in the past century).
The most important decision a country can make is whether to engage in military conflict, and make no mistake that is what we are about to do. Gadhafi's days are now numbered and most of us do feel some sympathy for the rebels, and especially for civilians in rebel held territory currently under attack. However successful the implementation of ano fly zone may or may not be, there will miss-steps; bombs will go off target, Libyan civilians will be killed either by a targeting mistake or by an American or Canadian pilot having in a split second to make a terrible choice when fired on (as happened in Kosovo and Iraq) by Libyan anti aircraft weapons positioned in school yards or on top of hospitals.
The world may finally be doing the right thing, but just be aware... if you support action now, be forewarned and make sure you still support it when - as will happen inevitably - the pictures that you see come back won't be very pretty ones. War - even a just and necessary one - is an ugly thing. We can easily become fascinated by magnificently designed ships and sleek fighter jets, but as Confederate Civil War general Robert E. Lee famously stated: It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it.